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On the Truth Values of Definite Descriptions: Examining the RussellStrawson Dialectic
Ibrahim Dagher, University of California, Davis
Abstract
A well-known critique of Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, offered by P.F. Strawson, is that a
central tenet of Russell’s theory, the claim that any particular utterance of a sentence with a nonreferring definite description will be either true or false, is mistaken. Strawson provides a
similarly well-known argument in support of this claim which at least in part rests on an analysis
of such utterances as implying or presupposing, rather than asserting, parts of the logically
existential proposition that Russell takes such sentences to be. For Strawson, propositions such
as ‘the x is p’ instead presuppose ‘there is an x’ rather than commit to the truth of that
proposition. And fulfilling this presupposition is a necessary condition for any such proposition
to have a truth value at all. In this paper, I aim to challenge Strawson’s analysis and will argue
that (i) we ought to take such utterances to really be asserting the logically existential proposition
Russell analyzes them as, and thus that (ii) the utterances of sentences with a non-referring
definite description do have truth values. I argue that taking these sentences to be presupposing
certain propositions, rather than asserting them, better takes into account certain principles about
which utterances ought to be declared false by an agent given their knowledge of other
propositions.
Introduction
A well-known critique of Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, proffered by P.F. Strawson,
is that a central tenet of Russell’s theory, the claim that any particular utterance of a sentence
with a non-referring definite description will be either true or false, is mistaken. Strawson
provides a similarly well-known argument in support of this claim which at least in part rests on
an analysis of such utterances as implying or presupposing, rather than asserting, parts of the
logically existential proposition that Russell takes such sentences to be.1
In this paper, I aim to challenge Strawson’s analysis and will argue that (i) we ought to
take such utterances to really be asserting the logically existential proposition Russell analyzes
them as, and thus that (ii) the utterances of sentences with a non-referring definite description do
have truth values.

There are other topics at issue in this dialectic––such as the adequacy of Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions
in the case of what have been termed incomplete descriptions. Such issues will not concern us here, but for the entire
dialectic, see Russell (“On Denoting”, 482-490); Strawson (328-335); and Russell (“Mr. Strawson on Referring”,
385-389).
1
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I will proceed as follows. In Sect. 2, I provide the relevant background on Russell and
Strawson’s analyses of sentences and utterances containing definite descriptions. In Sect. 3, I
explicate Strawson’s main argument. In Sect. 4, I motivate an alternative account to Strawson’s
and argue that such utterances do have truth values. In Sect. 5, I briefly discuss some objections
to my account before providing concluding remarks in Sect. 6.
Relevant Background: Russell and Strawson
Consider the sentence ‘the present king of France is wise’. Russell emphasizes that
though it is grammatically of the subject-predicate form, it is not logically as such, and instead
should be analyzed as the following existential claim: ‘there exists a present king of France, there
is one and only one present king of France, and it is wise’ (“On Denoting” 488). This reduction
of the sentence to an existential claim allows Russell to say that both ‘the present king of France
is wise’ and its counterpart ‘the present king of France is not wise’ are false, since they are
conjunctions with at least one false conjunct, and thus that more generally the proposition ‘it is
not the case that the present king of France is wise’ is what is true.
Strawson, on the other hand, makes a few important distinctions that lead him to reject
Russell’s conclusion. Namely, Strawson differentiates between a sentence, the use of a sentence,
and the utterance of a sentence (325). An utterance of a sentence is the actual action of its being
uttered by a speaker, and the use of a sentence characterizes the different ways in which speakers
might utter the sentence. It is difficult to spell out precisely what kind of entity a sentence (qua a
sentence) is for Strawson––the important point is just that speakers make varying uses and
utterances of the same one sentence. Two men uttering ‘the present king of France is wise’ in
different eras of the French monarchy would be making two different uses, and utterances, of
one and the same sentence, presumably one of which would be false and the other true. It is for
this reason that Strawson regards sentences as not having truth values––they are not the kind of
entity that is true or false. Speakers can make various utterances of the same sentence which may
be true or false, but it is spurious to assign the sentence itself any truth value. The sentence is just
what is used to make true or false utterances.
Strawson’s Argument
With these distinctions in place, we can now move forward in establishing Strawson’s
argument. First, Strawson (329) takes Russell to be committed to the following:
(C) Anyone now uttering ‘the present king of France is wise’ would be making an
assertion that is true or false.
More generally, Russell is committed to the claim that any utterance of that sentence will
either be true or false. This is because, for Russell, to assert ‘the present king of France is wise’
is just to assert the aforementioned existential claim. And since, on the occasion of any particular
utterance, it is either the case or not the case that there is a present king of France, at any
occasion the utterance will either be true or false.
This is precisely what Strawson proceeds to argue against. His argument can be
characterized as follows:
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Imagine a man were to ask you: ‘is the present king of France wise?’. Would your answer
be either ‘yes’ or ‘no’? It appears neither is the appropriate answer to give. This is because ‘the
question of whether his statement was true or false simply didn’t arise, because there was no
such person as the king of France’ (330, emphasis in original). His asking this question indicates,
or implies, that the man already believes there is a present king of France. As such, your
answering the question in the affirmative or negative would seem to imply that you agree.
In other words, an utterance of the sentence ‘the present king of France is wise’
presupposes that there is a present king of France. It does not assert this claim, as Russell thinks
it does. This explains why neither an affirmative nor negative answer to the question is
appropriate. The utterance is not an utterance of the existential claim ‘there is a present king of
France and he is wise’, but is rather an utterance which presupposes the former conjunct and
foregrounds the latter in the question. As such, if utterances are what have truth values, then it
appears a present utterance of ‘the king of France is wise’ does not have a truth value at all, for it
can only arise to the level of being true or false when it correctly refers to someone. That is, only
when its presupposition is true can it then be judged as a true or false utterance. Thus, a present
utterance of ‘the present king of France is wise’ is neither true nor false.
Challenging Strawson’s Argument: An Alternative Account
There are two principal claims in Strawson’s analysis, or account, of utterances of
non-referring definite descriptions that I wish to challenge. First, that such utterances presuppose
certain information. Second, that such utterances are neither true nor false.
To challenge the first claim, I wish to advance an alternative account of the utterance ‘the
present king of France is wise’. On this account, when such an utterance is made, it is asserted
that there is such a person as the king of France and they are wise. The utterance logically
implies (entails) the entire existential claim Russell explicated in his Theory of Descriptions.
However, when we are asked the question ‘Is the present king of France wise?’ it is important to
realize that we are not being asked the following question: ‘Is it the case that: the present king of
France is wise?’. I am inclined to think the answer to that question is clearly in the negative. The
utterance does not describe a state of affairs that obtains, for the world is not such that there is a
present king of France. What question, then, are we being asked by the man who inquires ‘is the
present king of France wise’? To my mind, we are actually being asked: ‘Which of the following
is true: ‘there is a present king of France and he is wise’ or ‘there is a present king of France and
he is not wise’?’. The answer to this question, of course, is neither. But that we answer ‘neither’
to this question should not be evidence for the claim that the utterance ‘the present king of
France is wise’ itself is neither true nor false. This point is particularly pertinent. It needn’t be the
case that asking the question ‘is the present king of France wise?’ should amount to a question
about the proposition ‘the present king of France is wise’ rather than the disjunctive proposition
outlined above. If I am asked if it is the case, or if it obtains, that ‘the present king of France is
wise’, certainly I ought to reply that it is not the case, or it does not obtain, that ‘the present king
of France is wise’. This is the proper test for whether such an utterance has a truth value, since
this question asks directly about the proposition ‘the present king of France is wise’. If Strawson
wishes to argue that questions concerning the truth value of non-referring definite descriptions
yield neither ‘yes’ or ‘no’ as answers, surely clarifying our question with ‘is it the case that…’
3
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ought not alter our answer. That it does, to my mind, favors the view that the man’s question is
not a question about the proposition ‘the present king of France is wise’ at all, and thus is not of
any relevance to Russell’s theory.
One might wonder at this point whether there is really any substantive difference between
these two accounts. On Strawson’s, the conjunct ‘there is a present king of France’ is taken to be
presupposed by the speaker, while on this alternative, both conjuncts are asserted, but the
speaker seems to simply be asking whether he ought to negate the conjunct about the king’s
being wise. What difference could come of moving our analysis from the sentence to the
question? Other than the fact that these accounts will differ with respect to whether the utterance
has a truth value, I will now argue that there is at least one principled reason to prefer the
alternative account over Strawson’s.
Imagine a visitor comes to your house and remarks: ‘I noticed you have a red air filter on
the roof of your house. But I have recently cracked my glasses. Is my utterance that ‘the air filter
of your home is red’ a false one?’. You are newly moved into this house and have never once
considered whether your house has an air filter. Whether it does is completely unbeknownst to
you––you are agnostic about this fact. And, as you know, the visitor has on rare occasion had
faulty perceptual faculties and thus his proclamation that he saw an air filter does not move your
agnosticism. However, despite being newly moved in, you are aware of this fact: no object in the
house can be red, as the previous owner thoroughly despised the color and made sure no object
in the house was red. What should you say to the visitor? It appears the appropriate answer
would be in the negative: it is false that the air filter of your home is red, and you should answer
as such. In other words, you know the visitor’s utterance expresses a falsehood. It seems
specious to say to the visitor ‘I am not sure whether your utterance arises to the question of truth
or falsehood, for I am not sure whether there is an air filter’.
Yet, if we are to take seriously the claim that utterances of the form ‘the x is p’
presuppose rather than assert ‘there exists an x’, and thus that if it is not the case that x exists,
then the utterance ‘the x is p’ is devoid of any truth value, it seems we should tell the visitor that
we are just not sure if his utterance ‘the air filter is red’ amounts to being false, for we are not
sure whether there is an air filter. But this does not appear to be correct––irrespective of the
actual facts surrounding the existence of your air filter, we ought to be able to say that the
visitor’s utterance is plainly false.
To add to this intuition, imagine your housemate was unaware of the fact that no object in
the house could be red. For them, there is indeed uncertainty about whether the visitor’s
utterance is false. However, if Strawson’s account is correct, you too are uncertain about whether
the visitor’s utterance is false. But how could this be the case, given that you have epistemic
access to information that makes it impossible for the visitor’s utterance to be true? Strawson’s
account may entail denying a plausible version of the principle of epistemic closure, that if an
agent A knows a fact F, and knows that F entails the impossibility of p, A knows that p is false.
But surely it is absurd to suggest that if an agent were to learn F they would not obtain a belief
about the falsity of p. It seems nonsensical to say to your housemate ‘by the way, no object in
this house could be red, but that will not assist us in determining whether what the visitor is
saying is false’.
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However, on the view that to utter ‘the x is p’ is just to utter that ‘the x exists and x
instantiates p’, it can be said that the utterance of the visitor is undoubtedly false. For,
irrespective of the verdict on the conjunct ‘the x exists’, it is known that it is not the case that ‘x
instantiates p’, and so the conjunction of the two must be false. Insofar as this conjunction is not
being asserted by the speaker, and thus their utterance is not necessarily true or false, the above
problems arise. Thus, we ought to prefer an account on which this conjunction is being asserted
by the speaker.
I have provided two reasons to think that to utter ‘the present king of France is wise’ is to
utter the existential claim Russell had in mind, and thus that the utterance always has a truth
value. First, when it is clearly asked ‘Is it the case that the present king of France is wise?’ I am
inclined to answer that this is not the case, which is just to say that the utterance is false. Second,
if utterances of definite descriptions presuppose parts of the existential claim Russell had in mind
rather than asserting them, then in cases where we are agnostic about those parts presupposed by
the utterance, our conviction of the falsity of other parts will not be sufficient for a conviction
that the utterance is false. But this is surely absurd, and as such, we ought to think of the
utterance as the assertion of a conjunction instead.
Objections
One objection to the challenge I have put forth to Strawson’s account of utterances is to
note that whilst agents such as the one who owns the house and is aware of the fact that no object
can be red cannot be certain that the visitor’s utterance is false, they can be certain that the
visitor’s utterance cannot be true (it is either an utterance with no truth value or one that is false).
While this is true, it misses the point of motivating the alternative account to Strawson.
Indeed, the house owner can be certain that the visitor’s utterance cannot be true. But the
question asked of the owner is whether the utterance is false. And, at least intuitively, given that
the agent is aware of information that makes it such that the utterance cannot be true, they ought
to be symmetrically certain that the utterance is false. That there is this asymmetry is precisely a
reason to prefer the account on which the visitor’s utterance is really an assertion of a
conjunction, which would maintain the intuitive symmetry. In the words of Strawson, when we
tell a man who proclaimed that the present king of France is wise that there is no king of France,
‘we should certainly not say we were contradicting the statement that the king of France is wise.
We are certainly not saying that it’s false. We are, rather, giving a reason for saying that the
question of whether it's true or false simply doesn’t arise’ (330, emphasis in original). That is
precisely my point: it seems obvious that we ought to be able to contradict the visitor’s utterance
in the case of the red air filter. Yet on Strawson’s account we cannot, and certainly this is
problematic.
Another objection against the alternative account might proceed as follows: the man who
asks ‘Is the present king of France wise?’ appears to have asymmetric belief states. Namely, he
believes that ‘the present king of France exists’ but does not believe, or is at least agnostic about,
the claim ‘he is wise’. This appears to be evidence for the account on which his utterance is
presupposing that the present king of France exists, and evidence against the account on which
the utterance is an assertion of both claims.
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Much of the same analysis applied before applies here. It is true that when the speaker
asks this question it appears as though he has asymmetric belief states. However, this is because
the question being asked is not ‘Is it the case that the present king of France is wise?’ but rather
‘Which of the following is true: ‘there is a present king of France and he is wise’ or ‘there is a
present king of France and he is not wise’?’. And, like before, it is when he is asking this
question that the asymmetric belief states arise. Clearly, if the speaker were asking the former
question, then it is not the case that they believe that the king of France exists but doubts whether
he is wise. If we are being asked about the truth of the entire utterance, it becomes clear the
entire utterance is what the speaker is agnostic about, not merely one of its conjuncts.
Conclusion
In total, Strawson’s critique of Russell’s Theory of Descriptions, at least in part, rests on
the claim that it is false that any particular utterance of a sentence with a non-referring definite
description will have a truth value. This claim comes out of his analysis of utterances as
implying or presupposing, rather than asserting, various content. I hope to have challenged this
analysis by providing and motivating an alternative account which denies this presupposition.
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